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The Gender Blindness of Good Theorists: An Israeli Case Study
By Henriette Dahan-Kalev
This article began life as a lecture at a conference that celebrated the 20th
anniversary of the publication of Shlomo Swirski’s book Lo Nechshalim Ela
Menuchshalim: Nituah Sociology Vesihot Im Pe’eilim Upe’eilot (literal translation Not Naturally Inept But Socialized to be Inept: A sociological Analysis and
Discussions with Social Activists Both Men and Women)1. The publication of this
book was a landmark in the history of Israeli Sociology in that in it Swirski put
forward an interpretation and analysis of Israeli society that contradicted that which
was put forward by those who belong to the Israeli sociological establishment2. Until
Swirski Israeli sociologists attempted to explain the ineptness and lack of success of
the Mizrahim3 in Israeli society as being a direct result of their coming from Arab and
Muslim countries. In his book Swirski offered a Marxist class analysis of their
situation and showed that their so-called ineptness was a direct result of institutional
arrangements and discriminatory policies. In doing this Swirski was the first
sociologist to give expression to the Mizrahi view of their own situation that had
previously been ignored 4 Swirski, the sociologist and the man, is concerned with
many marginalized groups in the Israeli state. This shows itself not only in his
academic work but also in the social action in which he is engaged. Swirski has been
active in the initiation of many social projects amongst which was the foundation of
the Kedma School (in which I also had the honor to participate). This school was
founded to teach children that the national educational system had given up on. In the
Kedma School many did, what they did not do, in their previous schools – learn - and
many of them also excelled in their learning.
In this article I shall use Swirski’s book as a sounding board for a theoretical
discussion about issues of marginality and gender in Israeli society. The first thing I
want to do is to draw your attention to the subtitle of Swirski’s book. There he writes
about both male and female activists. (In Hebrew, unlike in English, there is a
different word for activists of each gender). This shows that when the book was
published in 1981, that Swirski was sensitive to gender issues even though then it was
not the politically correct thing to do so. Swirski displays this gender sensitivity
throughout his book in that he never simply talks about for example, physicians and
teachers but about male physicians and female physicians and male teachers and
female teachers. However, with all this gender sensitivity Swirski failed in his
explanation of the so-called ineptness of Mizrahim, to distinguish Mizrahi women
from Mizrahi men. This is so even though in his book he discussed occupations and
professions where most of the workers are Mizrahi women. It is clear that he seems to
believe that his analysis and explanation of the ineptness of Mizrahi men applies
equally to Mizrahi women. This to me is a shortcoming of Swirski’s analysis in that it
exhibits what feminist theorists refer to as ‘gender blindness’.
My aim, in what follows, is to discuss a number of issues connected with
gender blindness that are prevalent in sociological studies about Israeli society.
Namely: (1) what is the sociological manifestation of the phenomenon referred to as
gender blindness? (2) Why is it that women are often excluded in theoretical analysis?
(3) Why is it that women are marginalized either intentionally or accidentally? (4)
What are the causes of women’s invisibility and transparency?
I draw attention immediately to the fact that in the previous paragraph I have
used a number of different words such as ‘invisibility’, ‘blindness’, exclusion’ and
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‘marginalization’ that are often not distinguished. This to me is a mistake. For
example when an invisible group is discriminated against, than those discriminating
against it are unaware that they are engaged in discriminating against that group
because they are unaware of the existence of the group as an identifiable group. The
use of the word 'exclusion' implies an active form of discrimination – a form of
discrimination that can only be practiced by people who can identify and recognize as
members of the group the people they wish to exclude from participating in some
activity or receiving some benefit. Failure to note what is implied by the uses of these
different words will lead to a failure not only to understand the phenomenon being
analyzed but also to identify and describe it correctly. For example, the Israeli
establishment discriminates against both Arab citizens of the state of Israel and
foreign workers in Israel. However, the causes for their discrimination are different in
the sense that the Israeli establishment is ‘officially’ blind to the plight of the foreign
workers while it discriminates against Israeli Arabs by actively excluding them from
enjoying many opportunities and rights that are open to Jewish citizens of the state of
Israel. In other words while it makes sense to talk about the marginalization of Israeli
Arabs being a result of policy of exclusion this is not so with regard to the foreign
workers whose invisibility is a direct result of that they are officially blind to Israeli
policy makers. Uses of these words also has important theoretical implications as the
different words imply both different political and sociological circumstances, and so
different social positions of the groups one is using these words to talk about. In his
book Swirski correctly draws attention to the underclass position of Mizrahim as well
as to their low economic and social status; but he fails to draw attention to their
identity as Orientals which is what distinguishes them from Jews of European and
American origins. Similarly he also excludes from his analysis factors pertaining to
gender. In this sense Swirski failed in his analysis to see and understand the special
plight of Mizrahi women in Israel, and so with regard to this issue, his book was no
different than that written by most members of the Israeli sociological establishment.
Some of the clues for understanding the causes for the gender blindness of Swirski
and other Israeli sociologists can be found in the writings of feminist theorists. And so
what I do in this article is to use ideas of some feminist theorist in order to uncover
the gender blindness that Swirski exhibits in his book. My focus in this essay is not
the feminist ideas themselves – and so I do not engage in a critical discussion of them
and I am very brief in my explanation of them5. My aim is to use these ideas to
uncover the gender blindness of an extremely good sociological theorist whose work I
greatly admire.
Diane Coole, in her book Women in Political Theory6, gives us a perceptive
analysis of the nature of women’s invisibility in classical political theory. She shows
that the universalistic mode of expression that is commonly found in the classical
works of political philosophy contributes to rendering women invisible. Coole shows
that in books like John Locke’s Second Treatise on Government in which he claims
that “all men are born equal” and in doing so he presumes and is presumed to be using
the word ‘men’ to also bespeaking about women, where in point of fact, he excludes
them. She argues that although the abstract use of the word ‘men’ is meant to include
women, and may even do so as it concerns their entitlements for rights, for Locke,
women as women remain transparent. She claims this because she identifies in
Locke’s writings specific references to women that show that they and their special
needs are invisible to him. Locke, like other classical political theorists such as Mill,
Hegel and Marx does not refer to women in an abstract and transparent way when he
is talking about issues that are related to the gender division of labor.
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Mill for example in his essay on The Subjection Of Women7 underlines
women’s social roles as to bear children and as being the ‘axle’ around which the
family turns. While Mill is in favor of improving the situation of women in
relationship to that of men, and supports the idea that they should enjoy the same
rights as do men, including the rights to be educated and the right to own property as
well as the right to vote, he fails to explain how they can practically do so while still
being responsible for their roles in the private sphere of running the household and
bringing up the children. For women to enjoy rights in the public sphere they need to
be able to play roles in the public sphere. As to how they are supposed to perform
these roles while still being responsible for bringing up children and running the
household, Mill is silent. Hence, while Mill does not theoretically limit women to the
private sphere and claims that they are entitled to the rights that can be enjoyed by
men in the public sphere, he also makes it clear, they can legitimately enjoy these
rights only if they do not neglect their responsibilities to their children, their family
and their household. Then again while Mill claims that women are responsible for the
private sphere of the household, it is also clear that even for him it is still the men who
are ultimately in control of it. Many consider Mill to be the founding father of
feminist liberalism because he claimed that women should not be excluded from the
public sphere. Now this is all very well as far as it goes but it really does not do
anything to change the patriarchal order of society. Mill, I am sure thought himself to
be a progressive thinker, as does Shlomo Swirski. But both of these progressive
thinkers were largely blind to the real situation of women.
Hegel also speaks about ‘men’ in an abstract inclusive fashion. However while
he is clearly aware of the existence of women he claims that not only do they have no
rights to take part in the political process he is clearly terrified of what could happen if
they tried to do so. He does everything he can, as a political theorist, to make sure that
women stay as far away from the public sphere as possible. In his The Philosophy of
Right, for example, he writes:
“…Women may have happy ideas, taste, and
elegance, but they cannot attain to the ideal.
The difference between men and women is like that
between animals and plants. Men correspond to
animals, while women correspond to plants because
their development is more placid and the principle
that underlies it is the rather vague unity of feeling.
When women hold the helm of government, the state
is at once in jeopardy, because women regulate their
actions not by the demands of universality but by
arbitrary inclinations and opinions. Women are
educated – who knows how?”8
My friend Rakefet Levkowitch-Efrat, who first drew my attention to these remarks of
Hegel said to me with regard to them: “I often think that we feminist scholars must be
masochists to spend our time dealing with writings like this. Don’t you agree?” I do
not agree with her. I believe that feminist scholars cannot afford not to comment on
remarks such as this from such an influential and important political theorist like that
of Hegel. Not to comment on remarks such as this is in a sense to affirm them once
more. When important thinkers such as Mill and Hegel speak of values and rights
which must be distributed universally to all mankind, women for them become either
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a transparent social category or a differentiated social category, that describes women
instrumentally as child bearers (Hegel) and as the axle around which the family turns
but never as being suited for government. Hegel goes so far as to assert that the public
sphere must be protected against women. For him this means that women are to be
excluded both from government and the military. This is not accidental, for these are
the spheres where power, authority and public resources are most concentrated. What
is the cause of Hegel’s fear of women – or some might say his misogyny – and what
leads him to exclude them from the public sphere and so to protect the patriarchal
order are questions that go beyond the scope of this article.9
The exclusion of women from the public sphere is not only a result of gender
blindness; it is also a result of class struggle. As a result of this women of the lower
classes find themselves positioned not only on ranks of the ladder below that of men
they also find themselves positioned on ranks of the ladder below those of better off
women. Swirski’s writings, and also his social action, have been devoted to social
groups that have been pressed to the margins. In his book on the inept he concentrated
on class as the primary cause of marginalization. More than this he devoted space to
explain the marginalization of women as being a direct result of the distribution of
labor on gender lines. In the interviews in part two of his book, in the sections that
deal with the housekeeper10 and kinder garden teacher 11 (pp.275-280), he stresses the
class aspects of their work which positions them in the margins in the sense that their
work is labor intensive with low remuneration. From this it follows that as Mizrahi
men are engaged in labor intensive work with low remuneration then Mizrahi women
are placed even lower on the ladder than Mizrahi men are, for their income, as is the
income of women of all identifiable groups, is lower than that of Mizrahi men. These
conclusions are re-enforced by the findings of the research of Debbie Bernstein12,
who was also Swirski’s co-editor of the journal Mahbarot Le’bikoret (Critical
Notebooks) which was published in the 1970s by the University of Haifa Press. Now
while, on this analysis, it follows that Mizrahi women comprise not only a different
category than do Mizrahi men, but also a different category from Ashkenazi women,
as I shall shortly explain, what is hidden in the Swirski-Bernstein analysis is the part
played in their positioning on the margins of society by the fact that they are Mizrahi
women and not simply by the fact that they are Mizrahi. This is a clear expression of
the phenomenon of the transparency of women as it appears in the writings of Israeli
sociologists. In this instance the women in question are Mizrahi. The question of the
lower positioning on the ladder of Mizrahi women than that of Ashkenazi women and
Mizrahi men is not simply the result of a social arithmetic function which claims that
‘a Mizrahi woman = a non-Ashkenazi woman + a non-man’. The status and identity
of women in general is not simply a function of the fact that they are not-men, but is
also a function of the fact that they are constructed as women in a patriarchal world at
a certain time and place. Swirski appears to be unaware of fact for on his analysis
there is no place for a category of Mizrahi women. Swirski works with two
dichotomies that fail to pick out what is specific to Mizrahi women: the first is the
Mizrahi/Ashkenazi dichotomy and the second is the men/women dichotomy. His
fixing on the occupations of kinder garden teacher and cleaning lady as the
occupations that Mizrahi women are concentrated in fails to explain why Mizrahi
women congregate in these occupation and why Ashkenazi women and Mizrahi men
do not. To address that question Swirski would have had to go beyond his Marxist
analysis and look at Mizrahi women not only as members of a certain socio-economic
class but also as comprising a social category with their distinctive own
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characteristics and this would entail distinguishing Mizrahi women both from Mizrahi
men and from other Jewish Israeli women.
Marx, the thinker whose theories provides Swirski with the framework for his
own analysis of Israeli society, also errs on the issue of gender blindness. Marx’s
analysis leaves very unclear the question of women’s liberation. On his view the
revolution will liberate all proletarians – men and women alike – from their chains.
However, Marx’s analysis fails to cross the threshold to the family home and ignores
the work done by women in the kitchen, the children’s room and the bedroom. Marx
does not speak directly about sexual relations or child rearing or household work as
relationships that help construct the subordinating relations that women have to men.
While Marx talks a lot about the division of labor in the public sphere he does not talk
at all about the questions of division of labor in the home, either before, or after, the
revolution. Some of these tasks are partially performed for Marx by Engles in his
monograph on The Origin of Family13 and later on by Marxist feminist theorists such
as Firestone14 Jaggar15 and McKinnon16 and others. McKinnon, for example, claims
that the place of sexual relations in feminist theory is comparable to the place
occupied by labor relations in Marx's own theory17. Sexual relations, she claims, have
as much influence in patriarchal society as Marx claims that labor relations do in
capitalist society. As labor relations are the source of alienation, exploitation and false
consciousness in capitalist society, sexual relations are the source of alienation,
exploitation and false consciousness in patriarchal society. Firestone compares the
way that the earliest feminist theoreticians dealt with sexuality to the way that Owen,
Fourier and Babel – thinkers Marx labeled ‘Utopian Socialists’ - dealt with class18.
She points out that it is impossible to develop an overall understanding of the
historical materialistic process simply by concentrating on the class relationships that
flow from the production process without also taking account of the relationships
between the sexes. Jaggar claims that Marx’s gender blindness is obvious in what he
say when he talks about the worker struggle, against oppression. While women are
expected to join the struggle she claims that Marx simply neglected the oppression
that women suffered in the homes19. Marx’s (and Engel’s) call at the end of
Communist Manifesto for “all the workers of the world [to] unite” overlooks both the
oppression women workers suffer simply because they are women as well as the
exploitation they suffer at home at the hands of their own husbands, who within the
household and are not simply only their husbands but also their own personal
employers. This shows that the male worker who is oppressed and exploited is not
made immune by this oppression and exploitation from becoming an oppressor and
exploiter himself. This is a point I would have liked to have seen discussed in
Swirski’s book because it raises in an acute form a problem that arises in connection
with the claim of some feminist activists that all women should show solidarity
because being women, they all belong to a group marginalized by men. However,
history shows that women of the upper classes, who seem to act out of the same
economic motivations to lower class women, as do their husbands, often exploit
women of lower classes. In her book, Caroline Ramazanoglu20 shows how capitalist’s
interest can undermine feminist solidarity. This is definitely true in Israel where
Mizrahi women have often found themselves exploited and oppressed by Ashkenazi
women.
All the classical political theorists mentioned so far attempted to put forward a
comprehensive theory of justice. This being the case the question arises: What,
despite their concerns and sensitivity to questions of equality, justice and their desire
to overcome exploitation and oppression, cause them to be gender blind? How is it
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that a theory which is ostensibly concerned with the justice for all regardless of color,
creed and sex, and which is consciously inclusive and egalitarian in its intent, is also
blind to the injustices done to women? Iris Young in her book Justice and The
Politics of Difference21, Iris Young argues that the cause of this gender blindness is a
direct result of the attempt of those theorists to put forward a universal conception of
justice. The attempt to put forward an abstract conception of justice which has
universal application to all places and at all times, is in Young’s view, the chief
culprit. All such theories are expressed in concepts that are very abstract because only
abstract concepts can have universal application. Concepts that are grounded in
empirical reality are concepts which do not have universal application. This means
that the universal concepts used to give expression to conceptions of justice in
classical political theory are at once very general and at the same time very far
removed from the facts of the real world at any specific time or at any specific place.
Young’s suggested solution to the problem is that theories of justice should be based
on empirical data and should give up the hope of being universally applicable. If this
would be done and theorists of justice would attempt to put forward theories that are
applicable to certain societies at specific times, that is that their theories would be
molded to fit the empirical social facts of the specific societies they are talking about.
If they did this it would be less likely that these theorists would be blind to the
injustices done to the members of any large group in the specific societies that they
are talking about. That is to say that Young attempts to collapse the distinction
between normative theorizing and empirical research. She recommends that
theorizing be grounded in empirical facts. She wants the theoreticians to theorize
about specific societies and the people in them. She also claims that until
theoreticians become aware of the differences between the different positions that
different groups occupy in the society, as well as the power relationships that hold
between them, they will have a real understanding these societies. She also wants the
concepts used by theoreticians to be based on empirical facts. What she does not want
is that empirical facts be organized and made sense of in according to abstract
universal concepts. To follow the latter course, as the classical political theorists of
justice have tended to do has led them to put forward theories which are at once both
removed from the world and blind to many injustices in it.
At first sight it seems that Swirski is engaged in the type of research that Young
talks about. Swirski shows on the basis of empirical how the inequalities that exist in
the State of Israel between various ethnic groups are re-enforced by institutional
arrangements that have existed from the beginnings of the State until the 1980s.
Swirki does not attempt to define an ideal of equality that is theoretically applicable
to all societies. What he does is identify concrete instances of inequality and these
examples come largely from his discussions both with workers - male and female - as
well as with their union representatives from different geographic positions within
Israel. His discussions with these people took place not only in the center of the
country but also in the periphery, in development towns, in poor suburbs, both in the
workers homes and in the places where they earn their low wages. The inequality he
talks about is the inequality as it is experienced by individuals who are largely
Mizrahim. This is the source of the importance of Swirski’s research for our
understanding of the so called ineptness, and the exclusion that goes along with it, of
Mizrahim, as being not the result of some arbitrary invisible hand, but as being the
result of specific social policies which were deemed to be just and to promote
equality, according to some abstract universal theory. It is at this point that Swirski’s
research connects with the claims of a conspiracy that Young talks about, when she
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quotes Marilyn Frye approvingly, who claims that there is no need for apartheid laws
for racist relations to exist amongst different racial groups within society22. Ethnic
differences in Israel are papered over in the nationalist and Zionist discourse about
the unity of the Jewish people and in the claim that all the Jews are in the same boat.
However, this discourse, as it is blind to the ethnic discrimination, also functions as
an obstacle to overcoming it.
Within the Israeli context this discourse about the unity of the Jewish people
translates into a claim that all Jewish citizens of the state belong to the Zionist Jewish
national collective. This claim functions to support and protect the unity of this
national collective, and so the identities of those Jews whose cultures do not fit the
stereotype of 'the new Jew' that the Zionists wished to create in the land of Israel,
were simply not recognized. That is to say, all the cultures that of those Jews which
failed to stress the Eurocentric modernistic and non-religious values of Zionism were
simply not given recognition in the public expressions of the Zionist ethos. The
political and social structures and the processes of socialization encouraged the
detachment of groups and individuals from the cultures they brought with them from
the Arab and Muslim countries of origin. These processes of encouraging people to
break their ties from their culture was never viewed as a form of racism nor even as a
form of discrimination that was practiced against people on the basis of their ethnic
origins. Hence, while groups in Israel were marginalized and discriminated against on
the basis of ethnic membership it was almost impossible to expose it as such because
the national ethos was simply blind to the existence of these ethnic groups.
One of the most important things that Swirski did in his research was to expose
one form of the powerful mechanisms that controls and regulates how this situation of
exclusion and marginalization works in the area of employment. He showed how the
mechanisms of the division of labor mirror the economic social and political policies
to ensure that those whose ethnic origin is Mizrahi will end up working in jobs that
are labor intensive and for which remuneration is low. Mizrahim, Swirski showed,
were not marginalized by chance. He shows that their marginalization was the direct
result of employment policies that were formulated and implemented by those who
speak and govern in the name of the national unity, and who from an economic point
of view had the most to gain from it. At the same time other mechanisms were also in
operation that worked both to marginalize Mizrahim and to detach them from their
cultural ties. The mechanisms in question were those of socialization that were
actively encouraged in the educational system as well as in the media. One of the
aims of these mechanisms was to cope with any criticism that might be expressed by
those who claim that the treatment of Mizrahim contradicted the talk of unity that is
expressed in the national ethos. These mechanisms worked so as to create the
impression that the concept 'Mizrahi' was not recognized to be a real social category.
When anybody claimed that they were being discriminated against or exploited
simply because they were Mizrahi they were identified not only as someone who was
talking nonsense – after all there is no such social group as Mizrahim – but also as a
trouble maker who wished to undermine the unity of the Zionist Jewish collective as
it was expressed in the Zionist ideology. That is to say any criticism of the Zionist
ideology was looked upon as something more than a criticism; it was looked upon as
an attack upon Zionism, and as such the Zionist leadership who governed the state,
tended to overreact against any such criticism and in doing so usually exacerbated the
situation. Hence, the category of Mizrahi was excluded from the public discourse, and
every attempt to use it in that discourse was immediately identified as a threat to
Zionism. This in turn led to the exclusion of problems faced by Mizrahim, because
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they were Mizrahim, from the Israeli public discourse and so is a contributing factor
to their marginalization.
Similar, but even more powerfully
exclusion mechanisms operate to
marginalize Mizrahi women; they operate once against their Mizrahiness (because
they are not Ashkenazi) and they operate also against their femininity (because they
are not men, neither Mizrahi men nor Ashkenazi men). This duality of the exclusion
mechanism creates a special problem for Mizrahi women when they make demands
of those who are responsible for their marginalization. The point quite simply is that
the demands that they make of men are different from the demands they make from
Ashkenazim and so when they make demands of men (both Ashkenazi and Mizrahi)
their Mizrahiness tends to be overlooked and when they make demands of
Ashkenazim (both male and female) their femininity tends to be overlooked. Hence,
the special social category seems to get lost in the larger social picture. This fact at
once functions to turn groups like Ashkenazi women and Mizrahi men to play a part
in marginalizing Mizrahi women and it also helps give credence to the claim that all
Israeli women are sisters and so they should practice solidarity for they are fighting
against a common enemy.
However, as I have already pointed out, this seemingly egalitarian stand papers
over and so helps to hide, policies of exclusion, exploitation, as well as
marginalization. When Mizrahi women complain that they are being marginalized,
discriminated against and are suffering from exclusion they are at once accused of
threatening either the unity of the larger Mizrahi group or the unity of the feminist
solidarity. In this Mizrahi women in Israel suffer a fate similar to other so-called
social transparent groups do in other societies. The claim of the larger group is
usually that the smaller group is raising irrelevant side issues that threaten the
ideology of group unity. Experience shows that the ideological mechanisms of the
claims for unity usually succeed in silencing the claims of the smaller but more
marginalized group. However, now they are being marginalized by groups who
belong to the same family of social categories that they do. The extensive literature
that deals with identity construction is full of references to the problems that are
connected with what is involved in using one category rather than another to refer to a
particular group. The point is one category highlights certain features while
repressing others that another category would not. One such author who writes
perceptively about this problem from a feministic and cultural pluralistic perspective
is Elisabeth V. Spelman23.
In her article “The One and The Many” Spelman shows how a universalistic
liberalism blurs the distinction that exists between various essential social categories
by abstracting the individual from his context and social relationships, and eventually
leading to the negation of what is specific to the identity of any specific individual or
groups of individuals. All the different properties that go together to make up the
identity of specific individuals are not constantly exhibited and visible. Nevertheless,
those who belong to marginalized social groups find themselves forced to hide parts
of their identity more than do those who belong to non-marginalized social groups. In
Israel an Ashkenazi Jewish male does not attempt to hide either his Ashkenaziness or
his maleness when he moves into the public sphere, whereas an Arab women when
she moves into the public sphere would tend, as far as possible, to mask her Arabness
and her femaleness24. Spelman clarifies this situation by using the metaphor of “the
custom’s hall”. She asks us to imagine that when we get to the entrance of the
custom’s hall we see that men and women have different doors to go through: The
green door is for women only while the red door is for men only. Now through each
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of these respective doors enter women and men whose other identifiable properties
are not given any recognition. So, for example, through the green door will enter
women who had different color skin, those who are poor and those who are rich,
those who are religious and those who atheists, those who are handicapped and those
who are non-handicapped, and those who are young and those who are old. The
differences that are not recognized in the custom’s hall are very important when it
comes to the cultural, economic and political identities of women when they step out
of the custom’s hall into society at large. Here the fact that a woman is simply not a
man is not enough to establish who each of them is. It is clear that each woman’s
identity is constructed from many different traits and properties, and simply to fix on
one of them as is done in Spelman’s “custom’s hall” hides more than it reveals. If the
“custom hall” for example was divided not according to gender but according to skin
color and people would enter through the door that is appropriate to the pigment of
their skin, what would remain hidden would be not only their gender and the classes
they belong to and whether they were old or young, religious or not, but everything
about them apart from the fact as to whether their skin color was light or dark. What
gets lost in the picture is the positioning of various groups and individual who go to
make up the larger categories. These groups and people appear in the picture – they
entered into the custom’s hall – they simply don’t appear there as who they are. Those
who decided how those who want to enter the custom’s hall should do so; it is they
who are responsible for what qualities of people are recognized (and regarded as
being important and significant) and those qualities which are not to be recognized
(are regarded as being unimportant and insignificant). The point is that there are
hegemonic groups that decide what enters the public discourse and what enters into
the arena of the public agenda. The implications of all this is that those groups and
individuals who find themselves low down on the social hierarchy will not be helped
to rise up the ladder by the universal talk about the equality of men and or the
sisterhood to which all women belong to, for these universalistic categories do not
recognize as important and significant the qualities that marginalized groups need to
identify themselves with.
What Spelman does not write about, but is discussed by such people as Nancy
Fraser25 and Charles Taylor26, who write about the ‘politics of recognition’ and the
‘politics of identity’ (identity politics), is the danger that can follow abandonment of
universalistic values in favor of values of specific group identities. Both Fraser and
Taylor point to the potential danger of identity politics, namely that the traditional
hegemonic groups who now control the public sphere by deciding which qualities are
important and so to be recognized as universal, because they are so powerful will
know how to utilize the new talk of identity values to protect the power that they
presently enjoy. Fraser’s and Taylor’s message is that it is important not just what is
said but who it is that is doing the speaking and from what social position he or she is
speaking. Is this person speaking from the center or from the margins? Is he or she
speaking from a position of power or from a position of weakness? Is he or she
speaking as a have or as a have-not? Fraser and Taylor stress that it is important to
distinguish two types of talk about equality and justice according to who is speaking.
Is the person speaking a member of the hegemonic group who speaks from the center
in the name of the common interest of society, or nation, or state, or is he or she a
person who speaks from the margins when he or she speaks about those self same
collective values of society, or nation, or state, but is claiming that these values do not
work to the benefit of all?
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Bell hooks, in her book Feminist Theory27 clearly displays how important it is to
recognize the place that people argue from. What she stresses is that all talk of all
people is partial no matter where they placed. Those who are placed in the center and
formerly speak in the name of the state are just as partial in their talk as those who
talk from the margins. Therefore, as the talk of all people is partial, the talk of no
particular person is more important than the talk of anyone else. hooks discusses this
issue in the American feminist context. The agenda of African-American women she
stresses, time and time again is completely different than that of the white American
woman. Whereas white women see their agenda as universal and talk of all women
belonging to one sisterhood but in point of fact their so called universalistic agenda is
not good for all women but is only good for women who are like themselves. hooks
refers to Betty Friedan’s The Feminine Mystique and claims that its principal message
is that “What is good for white women in America is good for all women in the
world”28. In other words to return to the “custom hall” metaphor the notion of
solidarity becomes the passport to let all women enter through the green door. But in
doing so it does not allow us to see the different types of women, those who are
marginalized, those who are excluded and those who are transparent. hooks’
complaint about white middle class feminists like Betty Friedan, is that although they
talk for all women and talk in terms of a universalistic feminist agenda, in point of
fact that they are unaware of the plight of women who are different from them and
they are also incapable of comprehending the different types of feminist agenda. If
they know something, they know their own situation and then illegitimately project
this on to all women and put forward an agenda that is supposed to be universal
simply on the basis of their own understanding of their own situation. Because they
are powerful, and because they are highly educated, and because they are articulate
and have access to the centers of power, then the categories while middle class
feminists use to talk about women’s problems and their feminist agenda, develop a
hegemonic hold on the public discourse. This situation makes it very difficult for
transparent and excluded groups of women to be heard in the public domain.
In his analysis about the ineptness of Mizrahim, Swirski showed in effect that
the Mizrahim entered “the custom hall” via the door of ‘national unity’. Hence their
Arabness was played down, it was not seen as something that distinguished them
essentially from other Jews. Their Arabness was seen as simply an ‘ethnic trait’, and
so marginal to whom they basically were - Jews. The official line was that being
Mizrahi was simply another way of being Jewish. This enabled the Zionist
establishment, who were largely Ashkenazi, to deal with the Mizrahim as Jews – in
this context simply as non-Arabs – and so to ignore their Arabness. This policy
helped facilitate the social, cultural and political positioning of Mizrahim in the
Israeli State: being Jews, they were positioned above the Arabs, but being ethnically
Arab they were positioned below Ashkenazim.
Whereas in the early days of the State the Zionist discourse functioned in such a
way as to integrate various groups into Israeli society, later on it no longer succeeded
in doing so. Today, the public discourse centers around questions not about whether
Israel is Zionist or not, but about whether a Zionist Israel can be both a Jewish and a
democratic state while it rules over a large permanent Arab minority29. Part of the
public discourse today turns on questions of identity, and as such, many groups who
were previously lumped together within the larger group of Jews are now able to
speak in their own voice in the public arena. This allows various groups that in the
past were unable to give voice to their demands to do so now. However this places
these groups in a paradoxical situation. On the one hand, they claim rights which are
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supposed to accrue to all citizens simply because they are citizens but which they did
not enjoy because they were Mizrahim or Arabs or women or handicapped, but on the
other hand, they demand from the state to treat them as citizens and not to treat them
as Mizrahim or Arabs or women or handicapped, that is they demand that the state be
blind to their particular identities.
The rest of this article will be devoted to the question how can weak social
groups, oppressed social groups and transparent social groups become empowered
noticeable and recognized? And more specifically, how is it possible to apply this
with regard to Mizrahi women?
Mizrahi women do not comprise a single homogenous category. In terms of
economics, culture, education and political orientation there is nothing that
characterizes all Mizrahi women. Unlike other distinct marginal groups such as the
Ethiopians women, Palestinian-Israeli women and Ultra-Orthodox women, Mizrahi
women as a group are at once invisible and lack legitimacy in Israel public discourse
to present themselves as belonging to a distinct social group. This invisible and lack
of legitimacy is caused by the complicated ethnic political struggle that is as old as
the Israeli entity itself. Before I can expend on this I need to draw a distinction
between different types of socially repressed and marginal groups, namely, between
groups that are legally and theoretically recognized and acknowledged, and those
groups that are transparent both to the law and to the social theory.
The constitution writers who were influenced by social contract theory not
simply to incorporate the abstract universalistic values of these theories into their
constitutions, but to add details specified to which specific groups the universalistic
values and principles espoused by the contract theorists would be applied to. For
example where social contract theorists claimed that all men should be treated
equally, the constitution writers specified which specific groups of men, and with
regard to what, they should be treated equally. This finds expression in the
Declaration of Independence of the State of Israel in the paragraph that states that:
“The State of Israel…will uphold complete social and political equality amongst all
its citizens without regard to differences of religion, race and gender.”30 Why, some
may ask did not the composers of this declaration simply write the universal claim
that “all people, without any exception, will be treated equally before the law”? Why
when they talked about equality, did they choose to specify that no exceptions would
only be made because of “religion, race and gender” and why did they not specify
also ethnicity and/or nationality, for example? Those who draw up constitutions, as
well as those who legislate laws are aware that there are certain categories of social
groups that are weak, and this awareness often leads them to protect them. This
awareness is also the basis of the justification for policies of affirmative
discriminative action. I talk about ‘affirmative’ discriminative action and not
‘negative’ discriminative action because the aim is to correct a wrong done to a
group, because it has been discriminated against in the past. The aim is to help them
catch up to others. Justifiable though this type of affirmative action might be, it
contradicts the universal principle that all people (meaning ‘without exception’)
should be treated equally. The recognition that people in the past suffered from
discrimination that was connected with their identity that is on the basis of gender
and/or their color and/or their beliefs, is a step in the direction of justice. However, it
is also contrary to the universal principle of treating everyone equally. When a
specific identity trait, like gender, is picked out to justify affirmative action, like it
was by the Israeli High Court, shows that the Israeli legal system acknowledges that
women are discriminated against and that this discrimination both needs to stop and

Journal of International Women’s Studies Vol 4 #3 May 2003
Published by Virtual Commons - Bridgewater State University, 2003

136
11

Journal of International Women's Studies, Vol. 4, Iss. 3 [2003], Art. 10

those suffering from it need to be compensated. The same applies to groups like the
handicapped and the Israeli Arabs, groups that are recognized as deserving legal
protection. This acknowledgement of these groups by the legal system is what allows
the claim to be made that there is a state of inequality between men and women,
between Jews and Arabs and between the handicapped and those who are not
handicapped. The law here identifies the cause of the inequality, but it also separates
this cause from those who perpetrate it. This is clear, for example, to anyone who
reads the High Court’s Decision numbers 453/94, 454/94 with regard to women
sitting on board of directorship as stated in paragraph 2c that “as it is both clear and
easy to understand the universal applicability and obligatory character of the principle
of equality, what is not clear and easy is to understand why women do not enjoy this
right. For historical reasons that are related to religious laws and ethnic traditions
equal treatment for women posed a particular problem until legislature passed the
Law of Equal Rights for Women (1951), which gave expression, content and legally
obligated the right that women should enjoy completely equally. (522 c-f)” (p.503,
my emphasis HDK) These words indicate that it is clear that the judges identified
women as a disadvantaged and discriminated against group and even explicitly
identified what caused them to be disadvantaged and discriminated against, namely,
traditions, religions, ethnicity. However, the judges failed to connect these causes to
any specific groups who are carried out the discrimination. The judge's decision did
not talk in terms that one identifiable social group is responsible for the
discrimination suffered by another identifiable social group, and in doing so, the
judges in effect absolved the discriminating group for responsibility for the
discrimination which it practices. The decision does not identify men, and or even to
women of a specific religion or of a specific ethnic group or a specific tradition, that
they discriminate against women of all other religions, of all other ethnic groups, or
of all other traditions. This in effect implies that it is only the survived historical relics
of religions, traditions and ethnicity that they are the causes of the discrimination that
exists within a contemporary Israeli society that ostensibly values the principle of
(universal) equality. The decision, by failing explicitly to identify those responsible
for the discrimination, that is those people groups and institutions that actually carried
out the acts of discrimination, prevents itself from identifying and punishing those
responsible for acts of discrimination to those they have wrong. This situation coexists with the claim of the Israeli Declaration of Independence recognizing that there
are specific categories of people that have been discriminated and so need legal
defense.
The logic of the Israeli Declaration of Independence is that the law ostensibly
defends the most weak. For example, that as women, Arabs and the handicapped have
been discriminated against in the public service by being under represented there,
affirmative action should now be carried out to secure these groups a fair
representation. It would seem to follow than that a women who is both Arab and
handicapped is protected three times by this law and that such women should be well
represented in the Israeli public service. I am willing to go out on a limb and surmise
that there is not one woman who is both Arab and handicapped in the Israeli public
service. What I am certain of is that if there was such a woman she never took the
public service to court because she was being discriminated against three times
simultaneously. To classify individuals in society according to a scale of how many
handicapped groups they belong to as well as to how many privileged groups they
belong to does not in practice guarantee that those belonging to the handicapped
groups will be protected. Then again, the system of classification appears to be

Journal of International Women’s Studies Vol 4 #3 May 2003
https://vc.bridgew.edu/jiws/vol4/iss3/10

137
12

Kalev: The Gender Blindness of Good Theorists

completely arbitrary and this holds even for those belonging to the social categories
the law specifically specifies should be protected. With regard to the people who
belong to categories that are invisible, that is categories that the law is blind to, and
does not specify that these people deserve compensation by policies of affirmative
action, the question of their compensation does not even arise. It is clear is that
disadvantaged groups that are not recognized by law and in public discourse, are
groups that are neither protected by Israeli law and are not the beneficiaries of
policies of affirmative action. This is the fate of Mizrahi women: the law and Israeli
public discourse is blind to their existence as a social group and so the law does not
protect them and they are also not the beneficiaries of policies of affirmative actions.
As I have argued earlier, Mizrahi women fall within two social categories, those of
Mizrahim and those of women. Many Mizrahi women, like many Mizrahi men, find
themselves pushed to the margins of Israeli society, excluded and discriminated
against, over many years by many state institutions, simply because they are Mizrahi.
According to the liberal legal tradition in order that a Mizrahi woman will be
recognized by the law, she is required to show that she falls under two conditions
which results in discrimination: 1) That she has difficulties in enjoying in a manner
equal to others certain specific resources that are distributed by the state, and 2) And
the reason she has difficulties in enjoying those specific resources that are distributed
by the state is because she belongs to the group of Mizrahi women. In this sense
Mizrahi women are like Ethiopian women and Ultra-Orthodox women but unlike
Israeli Palestinian women. Women belonging to this last group can come to court and
claim that they are being discriminated against simply because they are Palestinians
and/or women as the law is not blind to either group. Frances Raday, in her article
“On Equality”31 highlighted how difficult it is in a system of laws that is based on
liberal principles, for one lone woman to prove that she is suffering from
discrimination. The difficulty arises from the fact that liberal principles speak in
terms of the humanity of the person and do not speak of persons in terms of their
identifying characteristics, such as sex and ethnicity. And so a Mizrahi woman who
claims that she is being discriminated against because she is who she is, is making a
claim that liberal theory has difficulty in recognizing. Liberal theory only recognizes
concrete acts of discrimination that are made against individual people on the basis
that they are human beings and not because they belong to certain social groups.
Raday, following Cathrine MacKinnon, emphasizes that the appellant is required to
prove that the discrimination she has suffered was part of a pattern of discrimination.
That is to say she is required to prove that there were number of similar incidents of
discriminations that preceded her in which other women were discriminated because
they shared common characteristics for example that a certain company consistently
refuses to employ qualified women because they are women or more specifically,
because they are Mizrahi women. But until such time that the law is not convinced
that there is no such pattern the law will be blind to that woman’s claim. What is
more, until the law does not recognize that there is such a pattern the chances that
particular women will be able to convince the court that they are each discriminated
against because of their identity, are very low.
Within each society, different individuals display different levels of invisibility.
The invisibility of different individuals is directly related to whether the
characteristics by which they identify themselves are recognized both by the law and
the community. For example foreign workers are recognized by the law simply as “a
pair of working hands”: The other aspects of their identity, such as their origin, their
religion, their culture, is something that Israeli law does not see and so with regard to
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discrimination in these areas it cannot help them. In this respect foreign workers find
themselves on an equal footing to those social groups in Israel, like Mizrahi women,
that are not entitled to affirmative action even though they suffer from exclusion and
discrimination. Lacking legal recognition, the only thing left to those belonging to
such social groups is to involve themselves in a struggle for their right to define
themselves as they themselves see fit and not the hegemony be it the ruling class or
the law.
Chantal Mouffe, in her article “Feminism Citizenship and Radical Democratic
Politics”32 has written about the fight against the hegemonic power that women need
to undertake as being the only option for their liberation. While in her article, “The
Question of Identity”33 she writes about the struggle of women to articulate their own
political identity. For Mouffe marginalized groups must engage in a political struggle
to establish their own identity, a process that involves amongst other things liberation
from what she calls “hegemonic articulation”. Engaging in a political struggle begins
a process that involves the reconstruction of identity that moves the subject from
holding arbitrary positions that contribute to his or her oppression. For example, a
battered woman, engaged in political struggle will reconstruct her identity as a
feminist, and this lead her to give up adhering to the position that a battered woman
deserves being beaten. The political struggle for women, involves a process of
transformation from accepting positions of subordination as well as the things that
follow from it. Feminist politics for Mouffe, is a struggle of women to remove
themselves from the swamp of different connotations of subordination they find
themselves trapped in. This struggle she sees, has to go along with and is a part of the
struggle against all types of oppression. The payoff for women begins only when they
are recognized as a legitimate social group and so are transformed from being
invisible to being visible.
The subordination of Mizrahi women in this sense begins as soon as they enter
the customs room either through the door labeled ‘Mizrahim’ or through the door
labeled ‘Women’. No matter which door they go through certain aspects of their
identity, of their humanity, and of what is unique to their life experiences fail to be
recognized and so are in practice invisible. This is so even when their plight is
discussed in contexts of discrimination as in Swirski’s book and certainly in the
Israeli High Court’s decisions concerning affirmative action (see Israeli High Court’s
Decision no. 453-454, 1994), and the Reform of the Law passed by the Knesset in the
December 2000 concerning the nomination of women to boards of directors and their
representation in the higher ranks of the public service34 – in all these Mizrahi women
are not identified as such. John Rajchman in his introduction to a collection of essays
Identity In Question refers to an article by Stanley Aronowitz in which he discusses
the problems that the minority creates for the hegemonic group in society when they
fight for the legitimate recognition of their own identity. Rajchman points out that
Aronowitz argues that the struggle for recognition by an identity of a minority group,
which cannot be fused or assimilated with the identity of the hegemonic group, can
only begin a process where by the minority will be recognized as something “other”.
Rajchman claims:
“Minority identity is not only tragic
and hopeful; it also becomes problematizing
when it mobilizes something “other” –
something which cannot be assimilated
within visible, established, public categories,
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and which causes them to be rethought.”
(p.2)35
Mizrahi women are officially invisible in the sense that legally their status is
equal to that of Ashkenazi Jewish men. However, it is obvious to everyone who
knows anything about Israel that this is simply not the case. As such the only option
open to Mizrahi women is to organize themselves and engage in a political struggle to
establish the recognition of their own identity. This is not a struggle for them to
receive recognition that they are women+Mizrahi. They do not want to be recognized
as simply belonging to these two groups. They have learnt from their own experience
that when they have engaged in struggles either with Mizrahi men or with nonMizrahi women, that their specific agenda have not being addressed. In order for their
agenda to be addressed they need to be recognized as comprising a separate social
category with its own agenda and its own needs. The expression of their specific
identity and the specific forms of discrimination suffered by Mizrahi women are only
visible when Mizrahi women are seen to belong to a separate social category. Mizrahi
women can only be themselves, and the types of discrimination they suffer can only
be addressed, when Mizrahi women are seen to be a distinct group and not part of
either the group of Mizrahim or the group of women in general. To repeat, the life
experience of Mizrahi women has been constructed differently from that both of
Mizrahi men and of non-Mizrahi women. Hence, the stage of organizing themselves
for the struggle to place their agenda before the public involves a process of making
clear to others that they have an identity which is separate from the two groups that
people often classify them as belonging to. Obviously, Mizrahi women are not
identified with the strongest women’s groups in society and they are not directly
competing with them for resources, because in such a competition they are bound to
always loose. By the same token they are not in competition with the group of
Ashkenazi men. Mizrahi women are in direct competition for resources with Mizrahi
men and Ashkenzi women in the same sense that bus-drivers are in direct competition
with taxi drivers and not with airplane pilots. The theoretical basis of their struggle is
with the groups that Charles Taylor refers to as their “significant other”, which are
somehow close to them but from which they are distinguishable.
This type of struggle is in part essentially an antagonistic one because the
group in question is fighting for the recognition of its own identity by differentiating
itself from groups close to it. The struggle with these groups is a struggle for
recognition both of who they are and also of who they are not: Mizrahi women are
not Ashkenazi women and they are not Mizrahi men. Their first step in the process to
receive public recognition of who they are is to differentiate themselves from those
groups they are close to and to which they are related. This negative struggle is but
the first step the people must take in order to move away from the subordination
Mouffe wrote about and from the reduction of their identity that Spelman wrote
about. Mizrahi women must also engage in a struggle to identify themselves
positively and this requires them to define themselves by saying who they are, in
order to secure their recognition as comprising a separate social group. But their
public recognition will only be secure when their existence is recognized by the law.
As the law only recognizes groups that are defined positively Mizrahi women need to
show that they have a specific form of life experiences with specific contents.
Today, this struggle is carried on, like many other social struggles, only by
small number of Mizrahi women who are organized in a non-governmental agency
that calls itself Achoti (my sister). Achoti is only the latest organization in a number
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of organizations to take on this task. It was preceded by a number of other
organizations since the early 1990s36. I want to stress that even today within
organizations that are more powerful than Achoti, especially within women’s
organizations dominated by Ashkenazi women and within Mizrahi organizations
dominated by Mizrahi men, Mizrahi women are not acknowledged as having their
own distinct existence.
The most important source for the content of the specific identity of Mizrahi
women is their culture and history, a history that has yet to be written and which will
obviously speak of their struggles against oppression and stereotyping as well as their
struggle for liberation from poverty and misery, in their struggle against contempt and
subordination of women who had to live in the shadows of their caricatured images of
the Moroccan Freiha, the Oriental Aliza Mizrahi, the Yemenite Tziona and many
other figures that are the stock and stable of Israeli culture and show business. In her
book on Israeli cinema Ella Shohat presented the first analysis of the traditional role
played by Mizrahi women in the Israeli film industry37. What she shows is that in
Israeli films until the mid-Eighties the Mizrahi women was usually a figure of
ridicule.
The process by which Mizrahi women construct their identity and gain
recognition for it involves them in a struggle against being articulated and defined by
the hegemonic groups in society that Mouffe talks about. This process is a process of
dialogue, combative dialogue. This combative dialogue takes place within what
Taylor calls the “politics of recognition”. Engaging in this type of politics of
recognition, will force Mizrahi women to recreate a new language of the body, of
love, of art, of hate, of politics of women. This new language will be used by Mizrahi
women to define their and fix their relations with members of other groups. This type
of dialogue Taylor points out displays the relationships and ties that individuals have
to others within a specific group and the relationships and ties that one group has to
other groups. Hence, if until now Mizrahi women were forcibly positioned in
subordinate relations, ridiculed by the culture and invisible not only to the law, but
also in the political arena and to the history taught in schools, it follows that the
dialogue that they are now engaged in is both with those groups close to them as well
as to other groups in the society. This is not a dialogue in which they simply assert
their differentiation from the groups close to them; it is also a dialogue in which they
reconstruct their identity. I talk of “recreate” and “reconstruct” because this is not
simply a nostalgic return to their roots, nor a process of romanticizing the memories
of “the good old days”, but the construction of a form of identity that will give
expression to their specific life experiences, as Mizrahi women who comprise a
recognizable social and political group with its own differentiated status and that
warrants recognition both by the law and by the Israeli public. The Mizrahi women’s
perception of sex, gender, motherhood, reproduction, family etc, distinguishes them
from other groups of women in Israel. The stories they tell of their own experiences
as Jewish women with roots in the Arab world, the traumas they went through
following their Alyiah to Israel38 and even their pleasant experiences were all
different from the stories told by Ashkenazi women or Mizrahi men. Their stories of
Motherhood and of their familial attachments whose foundations are to be found both
in Arab and Jewish History, influences their perception and experience of western
civilization that they encountered in Israel. This is a subject that is only now
beginning to be seriously studied (Dahan-Kalev, 2002).
It is worthwhile to repeat so as to emphasize that the invisibility of Mizrahi
women as a group does not imply anything with regard to the existence or absence of
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their story. The invisibility of the Mizrahi women only points to their absence in the
official historical story of the state of Israel, and as a result of this absence, the
political and the legal systems have failed to recognize them, and so they find
themselves marginalized both economically and culturally, and also find themselves
repressed in the sense that as a group their existence is not regarded as legitimate. The
importance of the type of dialogue that Taylor speaks about in this context is that if it
was practiced it would allow Mizrahi women to express themselves and eventually
receive recognition as women who posses a specific form of consciousness, with its
own specific history, with its own specific political and economic positioning, that at
once has things in common with other groups but also possesses characteristics that
are specifically their own. Since Mizrahi women have begun to take part in this type
of dialogue some of them have found that their recognition for who they are does not
constantly need to be proved. That is to say that taking part in this dialogue is in
effect establishing them as an autonomous social category, differentiated from the
general group of women and from Mizrahi men as well as other groups such Ultraorthodox women, Ethiopian women and Palestinian women.
This process of dialogue carries within itself the capacity of expending the
ability of Mizrahi women to give expression to what they think and so this process of
dialogue works at the same time to undermine their discrimination. While they are
engaged in the struggle they are also uncovering hidden aspects of their identity well
as creating for themselves a place in political space. Then again the more Mizrahi
women engage in this dialogue the more they will be capable of talking not just on
behalf of themselves but also on behalf of other groups and so help open the doors for
them to enter the public arena. So in creating their own political space in the public
sphere by breaching the wall around it, Mizrahi women can an opening through
which others can also pass.
Prior to stating my conclusions I shall remind you of the principal themes of
this paper. It began with a discussion of transparency of women in patriarchal social
and political theories as they have been expressed in researches that focus on
discrimination, marginalization of social groups even by researches who are clearly in
favor of social reform. My point of reference has been Shlomo Swirski’s Not
Naturally Inept But Made to be Inept. While Swirski in his book deals with the
problem of discrimination against Mizrahim and their marginalization within Israeli
society, he displays gender blindness with regard to Mizrahi women treating them
only as a part of the Mizrahim. In order to create recognition that Mizrahi women
comprise a separate social category, they themselves must tell their own separate
story historically, sociologically, politically, and culturally. Telling this story involves
a political struggle which takes the form of a dialogue in order to construct the
category of Mizrahi women as differentiated from categories into which they are
dumped, like ‘Mizrahim’ and ‘women’ and entails them giving expression to their
identity as Mizrahi women. Israeli law already recognizes women as comprising a
group that is potentially subject to discrimination, and so it can come to their aid
when they are discriminated against either economically, politically and socially.
Mizrahi women of course fall within the category of women so the type of
discrimination they suffer simply as women is amenable to legal defense. However,
the discrimination they suffer as Mizrahi women is not amenable to legal defense
because as Mizrahi women they are invisible to the law. Hence, in the struggle for
their liberation in Israel Mizrahi women are partially dependent on the good will of
the Ashkenazi feminist activists who began and still lead the struggle to improve the
status of women in Israel. The first step that Mizrahi women have to perform to
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address their special needs is to differentiate themselves from other groups of women.
The second step in this struggle is to distinguish themselves from within the category
of Mizrahim. This second step is more complicated then the first because whereas
women are recognized as a social category by the law this is not the case with
Mizrahim and this is something that is preventing the adoption of policies of
affirmative action. The struggle for Mizrahim to receive the recognition that women
possess as a group that is potentially subject to discrimination is a political power
struggle that has been going on for years and for which there is no end in sight.
Mizrahi women stand side by side with Mizrahi men in this struggle, however, their
doing so has led to their special needs being swamped by the needs of the group as a
whole. In the political activity of Mizrahim organized both within political parties and
in NGOs Mizrahi women have always been, and continue to be, invisible. However,
there is one Mizrahi organization, The Democratic Mizrahi Rainbow39, that displays
some awareness of this problem in the sense that at least ideologically they pay some
lips service to the special plight of Mizrahi women and attempt to give them equal
representation wherever possible. But even this organization fails to give Mizrahi
women the space they need to pursue their specific agenda. Hence, the only
conclusion that Mizrahi women can draw is that they must differentiate themselves
from Mizrahi men and pursue their own agenda in their own organizations. This
differentiation of Mizrahi women to fight for their own recognition, if successful,
would probably contribute to the wider group of Mizrahim also being recognized.
Conclusion
Three main conclusions seem to follow from my analysis: Firstly, exclusion,
invisibility and discrimination are not only the results of a binary relation between the
hegemonic group and subordinated groups. Phenomena of discrimination, exclusion
and invisibility also occur within the subordinated groups themselves. Recognition
and differentiation of the specific character of different subordinated groups, can only
follow upon their setting up their own organizations, to pursue their own agenda, and
by engaging in a political struggle. Secondly, recognition by the law and the adoption
of government by policies of affirmative action are dependent on the success of a
prior political struggle that paves the way for the public recognition that must precede
legal recognition. Thirdly, because groups have been discriminated and marginalized
this does not imply that they themselves have been immunized against performing
acts of discrimination and marginalization themselves40.
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